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IN THE UTAH COURT OF AT.-; JLS

STATE OF UTAH,

s

Plaintiff/Appellee,
V •

!E

Case No. 890730-CA

4

BILLY J. VIGIL,

1i

Priority Two

Defendant/Appellant. !
BRIEF

OF

A P P E L L E E

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of possession of a
dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a felony in the third
degree in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 (Supp. 1989),
following a jury trial in the Fifth District Court, Iron County,
State of Utah, thte Honorable Dennis L. Draney presiding.

This

Court has jurisdiction in this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
S 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990) and Rule 26(b)(1), Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Whether defendant is entitled to dismissal based on

double jeopardy grounds because, after moving for a mistrial in
the initial trial, he was subsequently retried.

The standard of

review requires a determination of whether the trial court
appropriately ruled that, as a matter of law, the prosecution did
not act in bad faith or motive to provoke a more favorable second
trial.

See State v. Jones, 645 P.2d 656, 657 (Utah 1982).

2.

Whether the state met its burden of proof with

respect to the charge of possession of a dangerous weapon by a
restricted person.

The standard of review is whether the

evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn from it support the
verdict, State v. Heaps, 711 P.2d 257, 260 (Utah 1985), and
whether, as a matter of law, the weapons in defendant's
possession constitute dangerous weapons. Utah Code Ann. S 76-10501 (Supp. 1989).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
In addition to the provisions quoted throughout this
brief, the following provisions are provided:
Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-503 (Supp. 1989) (now in 1990):
Possession of a dangerous weapon — Persons
not permitted to have — Provisions for
aliens — Penalties.
(1) (a) Any person who is not either a
citizen of the United States or a lawfully
admitted alien whose business, occupation, or
duties require the use of a dangerous weapon;
or a lawfully admitted alien who has obtained
a special hunting permit from the Department
of Public Safety; or any person who has been
convicted of any crime of violence under the
laws of the United States, the state, or any
other state, government, or country, or who
is addicted to the use of any narcotic drug,
or any person who has been declared mentally
incompetent may not own or have in his
possession or under his custody or control
any dangerous weapon as defined in this part.
The Department of Public Safety shall adopt
rules governing the issuance and use of
special hunting permits for lawfully admitted
aliens.
(b) Any person who violates this section
if guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and if
the dangerous weapon is a firearm or sawedoff shotgun, he is guilty of a third degree
felony.
(2) (a) Any person who is on parole for a
felony or is incarcerated at the Utah state
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prison or other like facility may not have in
his possession or under his custody or
control any dangerous weapon as defined in
this part.
(b) Any person who violates this
section is guilty of a third degree felony,
and if the dangerous weapon is a firearm,
explosive or infernal machine, he is guilty
of a second degree felony.
Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-501(2)(a) (Supp. 1989) (now in 1990):
Uniform law —

Definitions

....

(2) For the purpose of this part:
(a) "Dangerous weapon11 means any item
that in the manner of its use or intended use
is capable of causing death or serious bodily
injury. In construing whether an item,
object or thing not commonly known as a
dangerous weapon is a dangerous weapon, the
character of the instrument, object or thing;
the character of the wound produced, if any;
and the manner in which the instrument,
object, or thing was used are determinative.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was initially charged with theft, possession
of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, and possession of a
controlled substance (marijuana).
after the preliminary hearing.

The theft charge was dismissed

Defendant was tried on the

remaining two counts. The first trial# which took place on
September 25, 1989, resulted in a mistrial following a motion by
defendant.

Defendant was retried on December 11, 1989 before the

Honorable Dennis Draney, in Fifth District Court in Iron County.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty on the possession of a
dangerous weapon charge and a verdict of not guilty on the charge
of possession of marijuana.

Defendant was sentenced on December

11, 1989, to up to five years in the Utah State Prison.

The

sentence was ordered to run consecutively to a sentence that had
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been previously imposed; defendant was on parole at the time this
crime was committed.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On June 21, 1989, two agents for Adult Probation and
Parole were conducting business on main street in Cedar City (T.
19).

One of the agents was defendant's supervising parole agent

(T. 19). The agents observed defendant and two others with two
or three color televisions in the back of defendant's pickup
truck/ which was parked in front of a pawn shop (T. 20). After
the agents finished their business, they went to the pawn shop
and spoke with the clerk about defendant's reason for being there
with the television sets (T. 20). The clerk informed them that
defendant's business with the pawn shop was legitimate, as
defendant had purchased the televisions from the motel at which
he worked (T. 20). The clerk then informed that agents that she
was glad that defendant and the others had left because they were
intoxicated (T. 20-21).
Defendant's parole agreement prohibits him from
consuming or possessing alcohol (T. 21). The agents went to
defendant's apartment to investigate whether he had been
consuming alcohol (T. 21). At first defendant denied the
consumption of alcohol, but then admitted that he had been
drinking (T. 21). A field intoxilyzer test confirmed defendant's
consumption of alcohol (T. 21).
The agents checked defendant's apartment for alcoholic
beverages (T. 22). During the course checking the apartment,
they located items in defendant's duffle bag (T. 22). The items
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included two large knives, one of which was a boet knife, nunchucks, and a throwing star (T. 23)* They also found a knife
under the seat of his pickup truck (T. 24) etad a fish fileting
knife inside a tool box located in his pickup truck (T. 23-74)•
The fish fileting knife was not admitted into evidence (T. 28).
One of the agents located a small butt of marijuana in
defendant's jacket pocket (T. 31-32)•
The defense objected to the proposed testimony of two
men, Stewart Fawcett and Alan Freeland, who would have testified
regarding ownership of one of the knives, that the knife was
taken without permission, that at the time defendant was seen
taking the knife, he was angry and upset and made angry, violent
statements (T. 38-45).

Pursuant to an agreement between the

state and the defense, the testimony was limited and submitted to
the jury by proffer (T. 47-48).

The proffer was that while

defendant was employed at the Brianhead Motel, Mr. Freeland
observed him place a knife (exhibit No. 1) in his belt and cover
it with his jacket while walking out of the motel.

He stated in

an angry or upset tone that someone had taken his truck, and
repeatedly stated that he was "sick of this" and was not "going
to let this happen."

(T. 49.)

Defendant had no objection to the

proffer in this form (T. 49).
Agent Barton testified that the nun-chucks and throwing
star were martial arts weapons (T. 23). Additionally Billy
Weaver testified regarding the nature of the weapons (T. 33).
Sheriff Weaver has twenty-one years of law enforcement experience
(T. 33). He is the chief defensive tactics instructor for the
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police academy in the state of Utah (T. 33). He has extensive
background and training in the martial arts area, including the
study of judo and karate, and he holds a fourth degree black belt
in aikido (T. 33). He identified exhibit No. 3 as "nunchakus, ••
which are more commonly known as nun-chucks (T. 34). Nun-chucks
are an Okinawan karate weapon used for inflicting bodily harm or
death (T. 34). He identified exhibit No. 4 as a "sharick," which
is more commonly known as a throwing star (T. 34). A throwing
star is a marshal arts weapon used for inflicting bodily harm or
death (T. 34). Although the weapons can be used for defensive
purposes (T. 35), they are more commonly used as offensive
weapons (T. 37). Nun-chucks are more effective than, for
example, a nightstick because the ropes betwecm the wooden
handles give more leverage and speed, which metkes the striking
power more devastating (T. 37).
Defendant did not testify at trial.

A.rehabilitation

counselor who worked for the state testified that defendant had
back problems, which limited his ability to work (T. 51).
Following presentation of the evidence, the jury
returned a verdict of guilty of possession of a dangerous weapon
by a restricted person and not guilty of possession of a
controlled substance (T. 57). Defendant was sentenced to up to
five years in the Utah State Prison, to run consecutively to a
sentence he was then serving and for which he was on parole at
the time the crime was committed (T. 62).
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The retrial of defendant is not barred based upon
double jeopaitly grounds.

On defendant's motion, the trial court

declared a mistrial during the first trial.

Defendant has not

shown that the prosecution engaged in bad faith or motive during
the first trial in order to provoke a more favorable second
trial.
The evidence at trial was sufficient to establish
defendant's guilt of possession of a dangerous weapon by a
restricted person.

Five weapons were admitted at trial;

three

knives, one of which was a boot knife, nun-chucks, and a throwing
star.

Based on the nature of the weapons, the prosecution was

not required to prove that they iare dangerous weapons by the
manner in which they were used.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO DISMISSAL BASED
ON DOUBLE JEOPARDY GROUNDS AFTER HAVING
^SUCCESSFULLY MOVED FOR A MISTRIAL.
Defendant claims that this Court should allow him to
argue that double jeopardy provisions preclude him from being
tried in a second proceeding once he has successfully moved for
and obtained a mistrial in the initial proceeding.

In this case,

defendant and the prosecution stipulated to the fact that he was
on parole at the time of this crime, which would, therefore,
render him a "restricted person" within the meaning of the
statute.

During the course of the initial proceeding, and

following a question by defense counsel on direct examination of
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a witness he had called, the witness made a statement which
referred to one of defendant's prior convictions.

The following

colloquy took place:
MR. SHUMATE: Agent Barton, in your capacity
as the supervising agent for Mr. Vigil, did
you sit down and go through with him and
explain to him the activities that he could
and could not engage in as a parolee?
[J. LOWE BARTON]: Yes.
Q: And that was reduced to a written
agreement. Is that correct?
A:

Yes, it was.

Q: Did you ever discuss with him the size or
number or character of knives that he could
or could not own as a parolee?
A: We never, as I recall, got into exact
specifics on knives sizes. In, I don't
recall the date, but the, the last time that
he was convicted for a felony it was for
possession of a straight razor.
MR. SHUMATE: Excuse me, your Honor.
for mistrial follows.]

[Motion

(R. 56-57.)
The trial court granted the motion for mistrial.
Defendant was specifically informed by the court that he would be
subject to a new trial (R. 64). Defendant did not make a timely
and specific objection to a new trial at that time, but instead
defense counsel simply said that he would prepare the order for
new trial (R. 63).
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy
grounds on October 6, 1989 (R. 50). The motion was denied on
October 21, 1989 (R. 83).
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Defendant acknowledges that Utah law currently in
effect is dispositive on this issue (Appellant's Opening Brief at
5).

Citing to State v. Ambrose, 598 P.2d 354 (Utah 1979) and

State v, Jones, 645 P.2d 656 (Utah 1982), defendant acknowledges
that the Utah case law is dispositive:

If a defendant

successfully moves for a mistrial, absent a showing a bad faith
on the part of the prosecutor/ he has waived a claim of double
jeopardy.

However, defendant claims that the state of the law in

Utah places an unreasonable burden on a defendant because the
burden of establishing entitlement to a double jeopardy bar is so
high as to render it impossible (Brief at 6).
Defendant's argument is devoid of any legal authority
in support of his claim of error.

For this reason alone, his

argument is without merit and should be summarily dismissed.
Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960 (Utah
1989).
Utah law on this issue is clear.. Defendant waived an
argument that double jeopardy barred retrial when he successfully
moved for a mistrial.

The only exception to this waiver occurs

when there has been prosecutorial overreaching or bad faith.
State v. Jones, 645 P.2d 656# 657 (Utah 1982); State v. Ambrose,
598 P.2d 354# 359 (Utah 1979).

Defendant does not even attempt

to establish that either of these criteria exist in this case.
State v. Jones, 645 P.2d 656 (Utah 1982), is precisely
on point.

In Jonesf a witness for the prosecution, the arresting

officer, testified that the defendant had been given Miranda
warnings and said he did not want to make a statement.
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The court

admonished the witness, outside the presence of the jury, not to
testify to any inculpatory statements by the defendant.

The

trial resumed, and the witness, apparently misunderstanding the
instructions, again made the same error.

The Supreme Court

stated, "The authorities generally hold that if a defendant asks
for a mistrial, he waives any defense he might otherwise assert
based on double jeopardy, even though the prosecution provoked
the error."

Id. at 657. The Court found the absence of bad

faith in the case and stated the record actually reflected good
faith and the absence of a bad motive.

Id.

In State v. Ambrose, 598 P.2d 3354 (Utah 1979), the
Utah Supreme Court stated that jeopardy precludes retrial unless
"(1) the defendant consents to the discharge, or (2) "legal
necessity" requires the discharge in the interest of justice."
Id. at 358 (footnote omitted).

The court must carefully consider

its ruling to discharge a jury to insure that an injustice will
not result.

The Ambrose Court cited to United States v. Jorn#

400 U.S. 470 (1970), a case in which the United Supreme Court
examined double jeopardy claims in the context of a defendant's
motion for mistrial, and stated that "where circumstances develop
not attributable to prosecutorial or judicial overreaching, a
motion by the defendant for mistrial is ordinarily assumed to
remove any barrier to reprosecution . . . ." ^Id. at 359 (quoting
United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. at 485).
Following Jorn, the United States Supreme Court
reexamined and clarified its standard regarding claims of double
jeopardy when a defendant has successfully moved for a mistrial.
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In Orfeqon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982)f the Court articulated
a narrow exception to the general rule, which was intended to
resolve any eunbiguity that the Court may have suggested a broader
rule in its prior decisions.

The Court stated:

We do not by this opinion lay down a flat
rule that where a defendant in a criminal
trial successfully moves for a mistrial, he
may not thereafter invoke the bar of double
jeopardy against a second trial. But we do
hold that the circumstances under which such
a defendant may invoke the bar of double
jeopardy in a second effort to try him are
limited to those cases in which the conduct
giving rise to the successful motion for a
mistrial was intended to provoke the
defendant into moving for a mistrial.
Id. at 679.
Under the standard articulated by the United States
Supreme Court in Kennedy/ which was decided shortly after Jones,
defendant has not shown that the statement by Agent Barton was
intended to provoke a motion for mistrial by defendant.

Under

the standard articulated by the Utah Supreme Court in Jones and
Ambrose, defendant has not shown that there was overreaching or
bad faith on the part of the prosecution or the court.

In fact,

the statement was made by Agent Barlow following a question on
direct examination by defense counsel.

Defense counsel had thus

"opened the door" and the question was not unresponsive, although
perhaps more detailed than expected.
Defendant's claim that he was "forced" to move for a
mistrial is not persuasive.

His claim is really no different

than the situation in any case in which a defendant moves for a
mistrial.

A defendant, in effect, is always forced to move for a

mistrial, and must always weigh the disadvantages of doing so
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when faced with this dilemma.

See United States v. Dinitz, 424

U.S. 600, 609 (1976).
Defendant has asked this Court to overturn, in effect,
established precedent by the Utah Supreme Court.

He has supplied

no legal authority in support of this request, but rather claims
that the burden of establishing bad faith is just too high and,
therefore, unreasonable.

Defendant's claim has no legal basis.
POINT II

THE CRIME OF POSSESSION OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON
BY A RESTRICTED PERSON DOES NOT REQUIRE PROOF
OF "USE" OF THE WEAPON TO ESTABLISH THE
CRIME; THE NATURE OF THE WEAPONS IN THIS CASE
WAS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH DEFENDANT'S
GUILT.
Defendant claims that the knives, throwing star, and
nun-chucks located in his possession are not dangerous weapons
within the meaning of the statute because the prosecution did not
establish that defendant "used" the weapons in a dangerous way.
The crime is "possession" of a dangerous weapon by a
restricted person.

Defendant has not cited to even one case that

supports his position.

Because he has not offered legal support

for his contention, this Court should summarily affirm his
conviction.

Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); State v. Warehamf 772 P.2d

960 (Utah 1989).
The purpose of the statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503,
is to deter persons who have been convicted of violent crimes
from thereafter possessing dangerous weapons.

See State v.

Nielsen, 544 P.2d 489, 490 (Utah 1975), cert, denied, 425 U.S.
906 (1976).

The critical element of the crime is that a

restricted person "may not own or have in his possession or under
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his custody or control any dangerous weapon as defined in this
part. . . ." Utah dbde Ann. § 76-10-503 (Supp. 1989).

The

statute does not contain a reference to "use" as being an element
of the crime.
Defendant's reference to Utah Code Ann. S 76-1-601 is
irrelevant to the question before the court.

This general

definitions provision includes a definition of a dangerous
weapon.

The statute# however, qualifies the definitions it

contains by stating that they apply H(u]nless otherwise
provided. . . •"

On the other hand, S 76-10-503 specifically

provides that the definition of a dangerous weapon is defined in
that part, part 5 o£ Chapter 10, of the Code.

The relevant

definition is contained in § 76-10-501(2)(a), which states:
(2) For the purpose of this part:
(a) "Dangerous weapon" means any item
that in the manner of its use or intended use
is capable of causing death or serious bodily
injury. In construing whether an item,
object or thing not commonly known as a
dangerous weapon is a dangerous weapon, the
character of the instrument, object or thing;

*Utah Code Ann. S 76-1-601(5) (Supp. 1989):
Unless otherwise provided, the following
terms apply to this title:
. . . .

(5) "Dangerous weapon" means any item capable
of causing death or serious bodily injury, or
a facsimile or representation of the item,
and:
(a) the actor's use or apparent intended
use of the item leads the victim to
reasonably believe the item is likely to
cause death or serious bodily injury; or
(b) the actor represents to the victim
verbally or in any other manner that he is in
control of such an item.
(Emphasis added.)
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the character of the wound produced, if any;
and the manner in which the instrument,
object/ or thing was used are determinative.
(Emphasis added•)
In this case, five weapons were found in defendant's
possession:

a large knife, m boot knife, *um-~cfaucks, and a

throwing star in tils duffle hm§9 &md a knife under the driver's
seat of his pickup truck (T. 22-24).

Each of t&ese weapons were

dangerous weapons because the manner of their intended use
established that they were "capable of causing death or serious
bodily injury."

An examination of the "character of the

instrument[s]" establishes that they are dangerous weapons.

Each

of the weapons, particularly the boot knife, nun-chucks and the
throwing star, are commonly known as dangerous weapons and,
therefore, could be characterized as dangerous weapons per se.
The large knife, exhibit No* 1, was taken by defendant
from a motel at which he formerly worked.

As he hid the knife in

his belt under his jacket, he stated repeatedly in an angry,
upset manner that someone had taken his truck, that he was "sick
of this" and that he was not "going to let this happen" (T. 49).
Although he did not use the knife in close proximity to these
statements, the statements evince his intended use when taking
the knife was not to use it for a legitimate or non-violent
purpose.

Exhibit No. 2, the boot knife, appears to have no

legitimate purpose other than use as an offensive or defensive
weapon; one would not ordinarily carry a knife in one's boot
unless it were to be used as a weapon.

The knife located in

defendant's truck was found hidden under the seat.
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Although the

transcript does not reveal the precise character of the knife,
there is no indication that it was a knife such as a pocket knife
or kitchen knife that could have a legitimate purpose.
The evidence established clearly that the nun-chucks
and throwing star are dangerous weapons.

Sheriff Weaver, a law

enforcement officer with considerable expertise in this area,
testified about the nature of these weapons.

The "nunchakus" are

an Okinawan karate weapon used to inflict bodily harm or death.
The "sharick," or throwing star, is also a martial arts weapon
that is used to inflict bodily harm or death (T. 34). The ropes
between the sticks of the nun-chucks provide more leverage and
striking power than a single stick, and the blow from nun-chucks
can be devastating (T. 37). Both weapons are used more
frequently for offensive than defensive purposes (T. 37).
Some courts have distinguished between weapons that are
"dangerous per se" and things that can by the nature of their use
become dangerous weapons.

For example, in Commonwealth v.

Appleby, 380 Mass. 296, 402 N.B.2d 1051, 1056 (1980), the
Massachusetts Supreme Court stated:
Courts have classified dangerous weapons into
two categories: those dangerous per se and
those dangerous as used. . . .
A "dangerous
weapon per seM is an instrumentality designed
and constructed to produce death or great
bodily harm. [Citation omitted.J Thus, for
example, firearms, daggers, stilettos and
brass knuckles are usually classified as
dangerous per se, because they are designed
for the purpose of bodily assault or defense.
On the other hand, pocket knives, razors,
hammers, wrenches and cutting tools are not
so classified. [Citation omitted.]
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In People v. Brown, 406 Mich. 215, 277 N.W.2d 155 (1979), the
Michigan Supreme Court considered whether a machete was a
dangerous weapon.

The court stated, "It is well settled that

some instruments such as stilettos and brass knuckles are
dangerous weapons per sef while other instruments are not
dangerous weapons unless used in a manner intended to inflict
serious injury or carried for such use.*1

Jd. at 157. Under this

criteria, at the very least the boot knife, nun-chucks and
throwing star would be considered dangerous weapons because they
are designed for the purpose of use as weapons.

Only when the

nature of the instrument does not establish that the weapon is a
dangerous weapon, does the nature of the use of the weapon become
relevant in the determination of whether it is dangerous.
In State v. Tucker, 28 Or. App. 29, 558 P.2d 1244
(1977), the court found that nun-chucks are dangerous weapons
because they are primarily designed and intended for use in
combat with the purpose of causing injury or death.

The

defendant in that case, as in this case, argued that the weapons
can be used for recreational purposes in martial arts and,
therefore, something more than mere possession is necessary to
establish guilt.

The court rejected the argument, stating:

"By

their very nature "martial arts," using implements in the
demonstration, involves weaponry, and a recreational "martial
arts" use of nunchaku sticks merely demonstrates their character
as weapons." .Id. at 1247.
In the present case, the nature of the weapons was
sufficient to establish that they are dangerous weapons within

-16-

the meaning of Utah Code Ann. SS 76-10-503 and 501. Because they
are commonly known as dangerous weapons, the prosecution was not
required to establish "use" as defendant claims.

Because there

were five weapons admitted to establish a single count, any one
of them will suffice to establish defendant's guilt.

The

evidence was sufficient to establish defendant's guilty of
possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person.
CONCLUSION
Defendant, Billy J. Vigil, was properly convicted of
possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person.

For the

foregoing reasons, and any additional reasons advanced at oral
argument, the State of Utah respectfully requests that this Court
affirm defendant's conviction.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

ay of July, 1990.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

BEARNSON
.stant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to
James L. Shumate, 110 North Main, Suite H, P. 0. Box 623, Cedar
City, Utah, 84720 on this

/ ffiday of July, 1990.

/7tyJ#u- / - ^ u t ^ ^
-17-

